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Abstract
This paper presents an in-depth statistical analysis of an experiment designed to measure
the extent to which players in a simple game behave according to a popular behavioral eco-
nomic model. The p-beauty contest is a multi-player number guessing game that has been
widely used to study strategic behavior. This paper describes beauty contest experiments
for an audience of data analysts, with a special focus on a class of models for game play
called k-step thinking models, which allow each player in the game to employ an idiosyn-
cratic strategy. We fit a Bayesian statistical model to estimate the proportion of our player
population whose game play is compatible with a k-step thinking model. Our findings put
this number at approximately 25%.
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1 Introduction
Game theory provides a formal language for describing situations where outcomes are deter-
mined by the behavior of multiple individuals, all acting in their own interests. By “solving
puzzles about how idealized players will behave” (Camerer, 2003b), game theoretic models
admit rigorous analysis and furnish sharp predictions, making them an important tool for
characterizing agent interactions in a variety of areas, from biological, to social, to industrial.
However, in some contexts—such as first-time interactions—the predictions from ideal-
ized game theoretic models fail to characterize observed game play. Mindful of this discrep-
ancy, behavioral game theory takes up the challenge of describing how people actually play
games (in the broad sense). Behavioral game theorists use “experimental evidence to inform
mathematical models of cognitive limits, learning rules and social utility” (Camerer, 2003b),
combining the rigor and precision of mathematical game theory with the experimental meth-
ods of cognitive science. Behavioral game theory is an active and rapidly expanding field
(e.g., Chong et al. (2014)), and to even outline its recent developments would require far
more space than we have here. For a book length introduction see (Camerer, 2003a). Suffice
it to say that improved understanding of how people reason strategically would be useful in
a broad range of settings, from product pricing to battlefield decision-making.
This paper analyzes game play data from a p-beauty contest, a classic game from the
behavioral game theory literature. A p-beauty contest, like the better-known prisoner’s
dilemma, is an easy-to-describe game that serves as an ideal instrument for eliciting and
observing strategic behavior. Understanding how people approach simple multi-player games
like beauty contests is an important step towards characterizing the ways that people tend
to reason about the reasoning of others.
More specifically, we fit a Bayesian hierarchical model to data from a web experiment
where subjects play against one another in several p-beauty contest. The goal of our analysis
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is to estimate the proportion of our player population whose observed game play is consistent
with prevailing theories of strategic reasoning, while explicitly allowing for individual-level
strategic heterogeneity. We intend that our case study may serve to introduce the wider
community of applied statisticians to the data-rich field of behavioral game theory. At
the same time, our new statistical approach to p-beauty data provides insights into player
behavior that should be of interest to behavioral economists.
The balance of the introduction describes the beauty contest game and also presents a
flexible “k-step thinking” model for beauty contest data. This model generalizes previously-
studied models called cognitive hierarchy models and level-k models. An abridged literature
review—providing pointers to the vast literature on beauty contest experiments, cognitive
hierarchy and level-k models—can be found in Section 1.3. The remainder of the paper is
devoted to describing our experiment, the data we collected, the hierarchical model we use
to analyze that data, and our empirical findings.
1.1 Beauty contest games
...professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in
which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred
photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly
corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole...It is not a
case of choosing those which, to the best of one’s judgment, are really the pret-
tiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We
have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating
what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I
believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees.
—John Maynard Keynes (Keynes, 1936)
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Each player of a p-beauty contest is instructed to pick a number between, say, 0 and
100. The game parameter p is pre-determined, common, and known to all players. The
player whose number is closest to p times the average number across all players wins a
fixed payout (winner-take-all). Other variants of the game are possible, for example, with
payoffs inversely proportional to the distance from the target of p times the group average
(continuous payout).
To briefly consider a concrete example, consider five participants playing a beauty contest
with p = 3/4. Suppose the players’ numbers are 5, 15, 20, 40 and 50. To determine the
winner, compute p times the average of all the numbers: 3
4
× (5+15+20+40+50)/5 = 19.5.
The player who picked 20 wins, because among all the players’ numbers, 20 is closest to 19.5.
The beauty contest is a symmetric game, meaning that all players have the same payoff
function. When the total number of players, n, is more than several dozen, one’s own play
negligibly affects the overall group mean, so that the game is effectively a guessing game.
In this paper, we restrict attention to p ∈ [0, 1]. Because every player is trying to undercut
the group average by the fraction p, the Nash equilibrium strategy is zero, meaning that
everyone playing zero is the mutually best response.
However, experiments consistently reveal that most people do not play the zero strategy.
On this point, the recent survey paper by Crawford et al. (2013) notes (emphases added):
Although Nash equilibrium can be and has been viewed as a model of strategic
thinking, experimental research shows with increasing clarity that subjects’ initial
responses to games often deviate systematically from equilibrium, and that the
deviations have a large structural component that can be modeled in a simple
way. Subjects’ thinking tends to [favor] rules of thumb that anchor beliefs in
an instinctive reaction to the game and then adjust them via a small number of
iterated best responses.
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Our goal in this paper will be to estimate from data the prevalence of such rules of thumb.
1.2 A structural model for beauty contest game play
Our model of strategy formation in beauty contest games supposes that player heterogeneity
arises from two sources: 1) idiosyncratic beliefs about the strategies of others and 2) the
number of iterations one proceeds, conditional on these beliefs, towards the Nash equilibrium.
To motivate this model, consider a player pondering her strategy1. Suppose she thinks
that most people will not understand the game and will play randomly with mean µ0. This
is, in the words of Crawford et al. (2013), her “instinctive reaction”. Accordingly, her optimal
play is pµ0. Upon further reflection, however, she realizes that some of her opponents may
have come to the same conclusion and would also play pµ0. This would mean that her
optimal play would be p times a weighted average of µ0 and pµ0, where the weights reflect
her beliefs about the relative proportions of the first two types of players. We refer to a
totally random player as a 0-step player, one who thinks a single extra step a 1-step player,
and so forth.
Let γi denote the level thinking of player i. An iterated reasoning strategy for player i
can be described via the following parameterization:
• a scalar parameter µ0i ∈ (0, 100) that represents player i’s belief as to the mean play of
the 0-step players, and
• a (γi−1)-by-γi lower-triangular right stochastic matrix Ωi, which we call a belief matrix
for reasons described below.
Right stochastic means that the row entries are positive numbers that sum to one. The
bottom row of Ωi represents the individual’s beliefs about the relative proportions of the
1Assume she believes that the game has enough players so that sampling variation of the mean play of
the group is negligible.
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various strategy classes below her, while the above rows reflect her beliefs about the analogous
beliefs of each of the corresponding strategy levels below γi.
Given these two parameters, one may compute the (µ0i ,Ωi)-optimal response from the
following recursive formula:
µ1i (p) = pµ
0
i ,
µhi (p) = p
h∑
j=1
ωih,jµ
j−1
i (p),
(1)
where ωih,j denotes the (h, j) entry of Ωi. A player with parameters (Ωi, µ
0
i ) has optimal
response µi(p) ≡ µγi−1i (p); in other words, expression (1) is applied until there are no more
rows of Ωi. We will refer to this model of strategy formation as a k-step thinking model.
Clearly, µ0i and the free elements of Ωi are underdetermined given only a player’s optimal
response µi(p) for a finite set of values of p. Earlier analyses of beauty contest data have
addressed this difficulty by introducing additional restrictions on Ωi and µ
0
i , both in terms of
the structure of Ωi and also in terms of limiting heterogeneity by assuming some parameters
are shared across players. Our approach is distinct in that we not estimate (Ωi, µ
0
i ). Before
sketching our approach, we briefly examine two previous models from the literature for
comparison, to observe how their additional assumptions impose restrictions on Ωi and µ
0
i .
1.2.1 Cognitive hierarchy models
A cognitive hierarchy model (Camerer et al., 2004) stipulates that
• Ωi = Ωj whenever γi = γj. That is, all players thinking the same number of steps have
the same beliefs about their opponents (and their beliefs).
• For γj = γi − 1 > 2, Ωj can be obtained from Ωi by removing the bottom row and
the right-most column and rescaling each row to maintain right stochasticity. Players
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thinking more steps ahead are able to accurately project themselves into the mindset
of lower level players.
Thus, in a cognitive hierarchy model, the belief matrices of lower-level thinkers are nested
inside the belief matrices of higher-level thinkers. Specific cognitive hierarchy models may
make additional assumptions. Common ones include:
• µ0i is common across i; all players assume the same mean for the 0-step players,
• µ0 is in fact the actual mean of the level-0 players,
• players’ beliefs about the relative proportions of thinker types is accurate.
For example, if γi = 3, the CH-Poisson model of Camerer et al. (2004) yields
Ωi =
 f2(0)f2(0)+f2(1) = 13 f2(1)f2(0)+f2(1) = 23 0
f2(0)
f2(0)+f2(1)+f2(2)
= 1
5
f2(1)
f2(0)+f2(1)+f2(2)
= 2
5
f2(2)
f2(0)+f2(1)+f2(2)
= 2
5

where fτ (·) denotes the Poisson probability mass function with parameter τ (set here to two).
In addition to determining the elements of Ω for each player type, the accuracy assumption
(third bullet point just above) means that τ also governs the frequency of player types in
the population.
1.2.2 Level-k models
A “level-k” model (see Nagel (1995) and Crawford and Iriberri (2007)) stipulates that each
player believes that all of her opponents are reasoning one step fewer than she is. In our
notation, if γi = k, Ωi has ω
i
g,g+1 = 1 and zeros elsewhere for g = 1 . . . k − 1. When k = 3
this gives
Ωi =
0 1 0
0 0 1
 .
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While the belief matrix is assumed fixed for all player types, the distribution of players
among these types is assumed to be general and can be estimated from data.
1.2.3 Our approach: estimating the prevalence of k-step thinking
Because the extreme flexibility of the heterogeneous (Ωi, µ
0
i ) k-step thinking model precludes
estimation of model parameters, our analysis instead centers around general properties that
would be exhibited by any k-step thinking strategy, for any parameter values. Specifically,
any k-step thinking strategy will satisfy the following straightforward conditions:
i) at p = 1, if individual i is a non-random player, her optimal play is µ0i ,
ii) at p = 0, the optimal play for any non-random player is 0,
iii) if γi = k, then her optimal play lies in the interval (p
kµ0i , pµ
0
i ) (this follows from the
extreme cases of assuming that all players are (k−1)-step or 0-step players, respectively),
and
iv) a k-step iterated reasoning strategy is a positive linear combination of the monomial
terms p, p2, . . . , pk, so is strictly increasing in p and convex on [0, 1].
Our statistical analysis will assess the probability that these conditions are satisfied for a
randomly selected player from the population, by fitting a purely descriptive spline-based
model to each player’s response data. Because the descriptive model is not restricted to
satisfy the criteria above, it allows that some players may not play a k-step thinking strategy
of any form, without requiring that such a player is a 0-step thinker in the sense of playing
entirely at random.
Our approach differs from most previous statistical analyses of beauty contest data in
that we aim neither to estimate a particular identified instantiation of a k-step model, nor
to test if a given instantiation fits a particular data set well. Instead, our approach puts
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player heterogeneity at its center and asks a related question: what proportion of players’
responses are consistent with some implicit k-step thinking model? Using this approach, we
are able to determine approximately how common k-step thinking is, in a way that mitigates
distortions due to potential model mis-specification.
1.3 Literature overview
To be concise, the literature review below is abridged, geared primarily towards providing
background for the present data analysis. For a scholarly and comprehensive review, we
recommend the survey article quoted above, Crawford et al. (2013). Specifically, Section
3 of that paper reviews the beauty contest literature at length. In what follows, we quote
directly from their definitive exposition in framing the contribution of this paper.
1.3.1 Data and theories
Among the first empirical studies of beauty contest experiments are Nagel (1995), Ho et al.
(1998), and Bosch-Domenech et al. (2002). The first two studies directed subjects to play
the game multiple times sequentially, with the outcome revealed after each round (feed-
back), so only the first round of play can be regarded as an initial response. Restricting
attention to initial response data serves to isolate the role of strategic reasoning from the in-
fluence of adaptation to outcomes from previous rounds of play. The Bosch-Domenech et al.
(2002) study is notable for being a large-scale newspaper experiment with several thousand
respondents. The main message of these studies was two-fold. First, “[s]ubjects seldom
made equilibrium guesses initially” and second, “[s]ubjects’ thinking is heterogeneous, so no
model that imposes homogeneity will do justice to their behavior” (Crawford et al., 2013). A
characteristic feature of the distribution of guesses in these experiments was local modes at
approximately 50p, 50p2 and 50p3 across different values of p. This feature was hypothesized
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to arise via players applying iterated best response k times for differing values of k (as in the
structural model described above), anchoring on an initial guess of 50. However, this inter-
pretation is underpinned by the strong assumption that players share the same initial guess
of 50. Also, “subjects’ initial responses were limited to one game. One observation yields
very limited information about the rule a subject was following” (Crawford et al., 2013).
Later papers collected multiple initial responses for differing values of p, without feedback,
notably Coricelli and Nagel (2009), but none on the large scale of Bosch-Domenech et al.
(2002). In our study, we collected multiple initial responses (without feedback) for multiple
values of p per subject. We recruit more participants than Coricelli and Nagel (2009) (whose
main focus was conducting fMRI experiments), and do not require subjects’ initial guess to
be shared.
1.3.2 Model fitting and evalution
On the statistical front, a common approach to investigating iterated reasoning has been to
specify a structural model, to propose an error model to capture moderate deviations from
the defined structure, and to fit maximum-likelihood estimates to the model parameters.
Particularly popular are mixture models positing a discrete number of player types. Influ-
ential papers taking this approach include Stahl and Wilson (1995) and Costa-Gomes and
Crawford (2006) (although neither of these papers considers beauty contests specifically).
This approach has two limitations. First, maximum likelihood estimation is known to suf-
fer from over-fitting of the data, especially in latent variable models where the number of
unknown parameters (player type indicators in this case) scales with the number of obser-
vations. This problem can be mitigated using penalized likelihood methods or, as we do
here, Bayesian priors and/or hierarchical models. In a similar vein, finite mixture models
present the possibility of model mis-specfication in terms of the number of types allowed.
Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) is mindful of this possibility, but the hazard is under-
10
scored by the fact that they leave 33 of their 88 subjects unclassified. In this paper we allow
each subject to play their own distinct strategy, while using hierarchical priors to “shrink”
strategies towards one another so as to prevent over-fitting.
A related, and more serious, drawback is that likelihood-based model selection is in-
herently sensitive to the specification of null hypotheses and inessential modeling decisions
(such as error distributions). One approach to overcoming this difficulty has been to seek
external validating evidence to “test a model’s specification and evaluate the credibility of
its explanation of behavior” Crawford et al. (2013). A promising method in this direction
“is to study cognition via measures that complement decisions, such as monitoring subjects’
searches for hidden information or monitoring their neural activity” (Crawford et al., 2013).
Techniques such as gaze-tracking (Wang et al., 2010) or mouse-tracking (Costa-Gomes et al.,
2001) have been used for this purpose. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) stud-
ies have even been conducted on subjects as they play the game. For example, Coricelli and
Nagel (2009) correlate estimated level thinking in a beauty contest with neural activity in
the medial prefrontal cortex. For additional studies taking similar auxiliary confirmatory
evidence approaches, see again (Crawford et al., 2013), specifically section 3.5, page 23.
In our study, we do not seek such external validating evidence, but neither do we test
our model against a null model with a formal statistical test. Instead, our approach is
to use multiple values of p as a confirmatory experiment. Specifically, the k-step thinking
hypothesis entails a specific prediction about how people ought to play as a function of p.
In a Popperian spirit (Gelman and Shalizi, 2013), we simply collect data and check—using
a flexible statistical model—how often players’ responses appear to satisfy that condition.
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2 Data collection
2.1 Estimation strategy
The primary focus of our analysis will be to assess if subjects’ game responses are consistent
with a k-step thinking strategy. As discussed in Section 1.2.3, it is possible to address
this question without having to reference the structural parameter Ωi. Instead, we need
only check that a player’s strategy function satisfies two necessary (though not sufficient)
conditions: i) that it runs through the origin, and ii) that it is an increasing convex function
of the game parameter p. We will refer to these two conditions as the k-step compatibility
criteria.
Because we do not impose this characteristic k-step shape during estimation, data which
nonetheless exhibit this shape provide an estimate of (an upper bound on) the proportion
of players who k-step reason. Critically, this approach demands collecting data for multiple
values of the game parameter p per subject without feedback. We now describe our procedure
for collecting such data.
2.2 Study protocol
Our data were collected from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, a web interface that allows anony-
mous compensation to game participants. See Buhrmester et al. (2011) for an introduction
to the use of Amazon Mechanical Turk in social science research.
A preliminary round of data collection was obtained where participants were randomly
assigned values of p ∈ [0, 1] (including exactly 0). This data is depicted in the scatter plot
shown in Figure 2. This preliminary study was used to ascertain a reasonable class of regres-
sion functions to use for modeling the player strategies and to help determine (informally)
what fixed values of p to use in the second phase of collection. In the end, each subject
played the game for p ∈ {0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 1.0}.
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All participants were paid a base fee of $0.25 for participation, regardless of the game
outcome. The winner of each game (for each value of p) was awarded a $50 bonus. We also
conducted a distance-based payoff version of the game, but, for clarity and brevity, we do
not report those results here as the substantive conclusions were comparable.
Our subject pool was restricted to Amazon Turk users in the United States with a
demonstrated track record of successful task completion2. See Buhrmester et al. (2011) for
general technical details about Amazon Turk recruitment procedures.
Game instructions were provided in the form of a voice-over video with visual aids, which
can be seen at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/richard.hahn/instructions.html.
Subjects were not explicitly told how many opponents they would be playing against, but
were told they would be playing against other Amazon Turk workers3.
Subjects were given an attention task at the end of the game instructions. Subjects
were instructed to answer a post-game questionnaire item asking for their favorite color by
entering the word “SQUARE”. This allowed us to screen for participants who did not watch
the instructional video to its completion.
During the game, players were provided visual feedback of their picks across different
values of p via a web interface. A screen shot of this interface can be seen in Figure 1.
The interface allowed adjustment of all six numbers (one for each value of p), in any order,
prior to submission. The web form automatically recorded the total time taken to complete
the games. Simultaneous submission, along with the graphical interface, permitted users to
adjust their game play to be mutually coherent without having to remember their responses
for previous values of p. This feature was introduced to ease concerns about the influence
of an ordering effect (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992), whereby the order in which players are
presented with the various values of p could systematically affect players’ approach to the
2The pilot data collection was restricted to India.
3We presume that Turk participants are used to large numbers of other participants in this context. On
the other hand, the instructional video demonstrates the game with only four players.
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game.
The post-game questionnaire collected additional demographics on each subject, includ-
ing age, gender, and level of education. Also included was a question adapted from the
Cognitive Reflection Task (Frederick, 2005), consisting of the following elementary (but non-
trivial) algebra problem:
A bat and ball cost $30.10 in total. The bat costs $25 more than the ball. How
much does the ball cost?
The time-taken to complete the questionnaire was also recorded.
Figure 1: Game interface as presented to study subjects online. The form is presented
to subjects empty to start. Here, to demonstrate the plotting functionality, it is shown
configured as if a player responded with the number 15 for every value of p.
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Figure 2: Responses of 100 subjects over eight one-shot beauty contests. The smoothed
empirical mean is shown in solid and the ex post optimal strategy is shown dashed. Note
the non-Nash plays at p = 0.
2.3 Data summaries
In this section, we present some summary statistics from our data collection effort. These
summaries serve to characterize our study population and thus will help put our findings in
context. We also show example game play data, to illustrate the variety of patterns observed.
In the final collection, we had n = 106 subjects, 56% female and 44% male, with median
age of 30. Education level statistics are given in Table 1. While 80% satisfied the attention
task, only 34% passed the cognitive reflection task. Figure 3 shows histograms of age,
time to complete all six games, and combined time to complete games and questionnaire.
It is possible that our subject pool is unrepresentative—in one sense or another—of the
prototypical strategic reasoner. To be conservative, our inferences should be interpreted as
applying narrowly to the population of U.S.-based Amazon Turkers. We leave unaddressed
the question of how best to extrapolate our findings to other populations, but maintain that
extending our analysis to other populations would be straightforward with additional data.
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Table 1: Educational statistics of our study population.
Education Prevalence (%)
Associates deg. 8.5
Bachelors deg. 36.0
Graduate deg. 13.0
High school diploma 7.5
Some college 31.0
Some high school 4.0
Age in years
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Figure 3: Histograms of (from left to right) subject age, time to complete all six games, and
the time to complete both the six games and the questionnaire.
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Figure 4 shows histograms of player responses at each value of p. This has been a standard
way to visualize beauty contest data. Observe that the modes in the data appear to migrate
upwards with higher values of p. Notice also a clear mode near 1/2 in the p = 1 data.
For data with multiple games per subject without feedback, such as ours, it is perhaps
more illuminating to look at the data in a scatterplot, per subject. Figure 5 shows four sets
of data collected from representative subjects. The fact that responses typically increase
with p suggests that subjects are generally attending to the experimental task.
3 A statistical model for beauty contest data
Our statistical analysis follows from a hierarchical model in which each individual has their
own mean regression curve, which describes their strategy as a function of the game pa-
rameter p. These individual strategies share a common prior distribution with unknown
hyperparameters.
In this section, we provide the details of this model, including prior specification4. We
specify our model in terms of three components: a model for random variation in players’
responses, a model for each player’s strategy as a function of p, and a description of the
hyperparameters that are shared across players.
3.1 Random variation in player responses
We allow that players’ responses can deviate from their underlying strategy owing to inat-
tention or other unobserved contextual factors5. Specifically, we assume that player re-
sponses yi(p) (rescaled to the unit interval) arise as draws from a Beta distribution. Letting
4Computational details are given in Appendix A. Trace plots and other diagnostic plots of key model
parameters are provided in Appendix B.
5We do not suppose that players entertain the possibility that their opponents will bid with error. This
possibility can be accommodated with additional assumptions on the nature of the errors, but we do not
further consider this issue here.
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Figure 4: Histograms of player responses for each value of p. Responses are rescaled to the
unit interval.
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Figure 5: Game data from four subjects. Responses are rescaled to the unit interval.
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Figure 6: Players can be one of five types, differing in the amount of precision with which
they play about their mean strategy. Here, the densities of the five types are shown for their
corresponding values of s when the mean strategy is fixed at 0.3.
µi(p) ≡ E{yi(p)}, our player response model is
yi(p) | µi, si ∼ Beta(ciµi(p), ci(1− µi(p))). (2)
To restrict this model to be unimodal, we define ci ≡ si×max(1/µi, 1/(1−µi)) with si > 1.
In this parametrization, si controls the precision of player response distributions; higher
values of si correspond to higher values of ci, which correspond in turn to density functions
that are more sharply peaked about the mean, µi(p).
We place a discrete prior on si, defined by the five possible values, {1.2, 3, 21, 51, 101},
and a probability vector w. The choice of these values gives a wide range of player “types”
ranging from imprecise to precise, as shown in Figure 6. The prior on w is discussed in
Section 3.2.2.
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3.2 Mean response (strategy) curves
The k-step compatibility criteria from Section 2.1 can now be stated directly in terms of the
expected player response function µi(p): i) µi(0) = 0, and ii) µi(p) is convex and increasing
in p. To facilitate verifying that these criteria are satisfied, we specify µi(p) in terms of a
four-parameter vector, θi ≡ (ηi, φi, νi, µ0i ), using a spline representation. (In the following
discussion, we suppress subscripts for convenience.)
Intuitively, θ defines three control points in the (p, y) plane: (0, φ), (η, ν) and (1, µ0). The
function µ(p) is determined by drawing a smooth monotone curve through these points. By
monotone6, we mean that µ(p) is monotonically increasing if and only if φ ≤ ν ≤ µ0. The
left control point, (0, φ), controls whether or not µ(p) intersects the origin, which happens
precisely when φ = 0. Likewise, the right control point is given by (1, µ0). Now, imagine
drawing a straight line between (0, φ) and (1, µ0). If the interior control point, (η, ν), lies
below this line, then µ(p) is convex, otherwise it is not. In other words, µi(p) will be convex
if and only if
ν < (µ0 − φ)η + φ. (3)
This inequality allows us to control the prior probability of a convex strategy via the prior
for νi, conditional on the other three spline parameters (φ, η, µ
0). Example curves are shown
in Figure 7.
6We implement the spline component of the model via the R function splineFun() with setting method
= ‘mono’, which is based on the method of Fritsch and Carlson (1980).
21
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
p
R
es
po
ns
e
Figure 7: Three curves are shown with associated parameters θdashed =
(0.4, 0.3, 0.7, 0.4), θdotted = (0.5, 0, 0.2, 0.5) and θsolid = (0.3, 0, 0.4, 0.7) shown as points. The
dashed curve neither intersects the origin nor is convex. The dotted curve intersects the
origin but is not convex. The solid curve both intersects the origin and is convex. Only the
solid curve could represent a k-step thinking strategy.
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3.2.1 Prior for µi(p)
The prior on each µi(p) is induced via priors on the parameters ηi, φi, νi, and µ
0
i .
Priors over µ0i and ηi
First, µ0i , which defines the right control point (1, µ
0), is given an independent Beta(3/2, 1)
prior. Similarly, ηi, which determines the horizontal location of the interior control point
(ηi, νi), is given an independent Beta(5, 5) prior, rescaled to be supported on interval [0.3, 0.7].
This restricted support improves numerics by preventing linear trends from being fit by ηi
values near 0 or 1.
Prior over φi
Next, φi defines the left control point (0, φ). To control the probability that µi(p) runs
through the origin, we place a prior over φi with a point mass at zero
φi | ρ, µ0i ∼ ρδ0 + (1− ρ)Beta(cµ0i , c(1− µ0i )) (4)
and c = 2 max (1/µ0i , 1/(1− µ0i )). This is a zero-inflated mixture with weights ρ and 1−ρ. We
condition on µ0 so that the continuous portion of the prior specifies E(φ | µ0i , φ 6= 0) = µ0i .
The parameter ρ thus determines the probability that a randomly selected strategy runs
through the origin.
Prior over νi
Finally, we describe a prior over νi, the vertical component of the interior control point
(ηi, νi). We specify this prior in terms of a binary latent variable, κi, that designates if µi(p)
is convex or not. Specifically, if κi = 1, we must have that νi < (µ
0
i − φi)ηi + φi; the interior
control point lies below the line segment running between the left control point (0, φ) and
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the right control point (1, µ0). As we wish to remain uninformative about the likely values
of νi, we give it a uniform prior on [0, (µ
0
i − φi)ηi + φi]. By the same reasoning, if κi = 0, we
give νi a uniform prior on [(µ
0
i − φi)ηi + φi, 1].
To complete this prior, we give the latent indicator of convexity, κi, a Bernoulli distribu-
tion that depends explicitly on the left control point (0, φi); strategy curves that intersect the
origin can have different probabilities of being convex than strategies that do not intersect
the origin. That is, Pr(κi = 1 | φi = 0) ≡ q0 and Pr(κi = 1 | φi 6= 0) ≡ q1.
The above parametrization allows us to conveniently express the probability that a ran-
domly selected strategy could have arisen from k-step reasoning:
Pr(κi = 1, φi = 0) = Pr(φi = 0)Pr(κi = 1 | φi = 0) = ρq0. (5)
Posterior inferences concerning prevalence of k-step thinking will thus follow directly from
the posterior over these parameters.
3.2.2 Priors over shared hyperparameters
Figure 8 illustrates the dependence structure between the data yi, the parameters governing
µi(p), {φi, ηi, νi, µ0i }, and the shared hyperparameters, {w, q0, q1, ρ}. Although each player
is permitted to have her own strategy, the shared hyperparameters shrink the individual
estimates towards the group mean, mitigating the risk of over-fitting.
Expression (5) shows that ρ and q0 directly quantify the prevalence of k-step compat-
ible strategies. Hence, priors over these parameters have the potential to strongly influ-
ence posterior inferences. For the analysis described in Section 4, we used ρ ∼ Beta(3, 1),
q0 ∼ Beta(3, 1) and q1 ∼ Beta(1, 3). These choices reflect a favorable bias toward k-step
compatible strategies, in that E(ρq0) = 9/16, but are sufficiently diffuse to allow the data to
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Figure 8: A diagram of the dependence structure in our statistical model of beauty contest
strategies curves and observed responses. The dotted box indicates n replicates, indexed by i.
The circled variable yi denotes the vector of observed responses. The solid box with rounded
edges contains the parameters defining the mean response function µi(p) by monotone spline
interpolation. The parameter si controls the response error scale. The hyperparameters w,
ρ, and q = (q0, q1) are shared across all players.
contradict this bias.
The above choices, as well as the priors over µ0i and ηi described above, were guided
by visual inspection of strategy curves drawn from the prior. The first panel of Figure
9 illustrates many realizations from the prior over µ(p). Strategies consistent with k-step
reasoning are shown in black, and non-k-step-compliant strategies are shown in gray.
Lastly, the parameter w governs the prevalence of “imprecise” players versus “precise”
players in that it encodes the relative frequencies of more diffuse Beta distributions versus
less diffuse (more concentrated) Beta distributions. We give w a Dirichlet prior with mode
parameter α = (0.1, 0.25, 0.3, 0.25, 0.1), which is symmetric and unimodal over the range
of possible values, {1.2, 3, 21, 51, 101}. See again Figure 6 for a visualization of the Beta
distributions implied by these values.
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Figure 9: The first panel shows one hundred randomly drawn strategies from the prior; k-
step-compliant strategies are shown in black and non-k-step compatible strategies are shown
in gray. For comparison, the second panel shows level-k strategies (out to ten levels).
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4 Results and Future Work
The analysis below is based on 10,000 samples drawn from a Markov chain Monte Carlo
simulation of our posterior distribution, after a burn-in period of 5,000 samples. For de-
tails on our computational implementation and convergence diagnostics, see the Appendices.
The code to reproduce our plots, as well as the data to run it on, can be found online at
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/richard.hahn/.
4.1 The prevalence of k-step compatible strategies
Our main finding is that approximately 25% of subjects appear to play k-step compatible
strategies. Recall that ρq0 represents (an upper bound on) the probability that a randomly
selected subject applies k-step reasoning. The posterior mean of ρq0 is 26%, with a 95%-tile
of 35%. By contrast, the prior mean was 56% with a 95%-tile of 89%. Figure 10 depicts a
kernel-smoothed Monte Carlo estimate of the posterior density of ρq0.
On the other hand, a majority of player strategies seem to satisfy the first k-step com-
patibility criterion: intersecting the origin. Recall that ρ represents the probability that a
randomly selected participant’s strategy intersects the origin. The posterior mean of ρ is
87%. Figure 11 depicts a kernel-smoothed Monte Carlo estimate of the posterior density of
ρ.
However, even among players whose strategy intersects the origin, convex strategies are
not the norm. Recall that q0 represents the probability that a randomly selected participant
plays a convex strategy, given that her strategy intersects the origin. The posterior mean
of q0 is 30%, with a 95%-tile of 40%. Figure 12 depicts a kernel-smoothed Monte Carlo
estimate of the posterior density of q0.
Therefore, while some individuals may arrive at their strategies via k-step reasoning,
many more appear to play strategies that do not correspond to any k-step derived strategy.
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Figure 10: The probability that a randomly selected participant plays a strategy that is
k-step compatible is calculated as ρq0. The solid line shows the posterior density of ρq0, and
the dashed line shows the corresponding prior density. The posterior mean is 26%.
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Figure 11: The probability that a randomly selected participant plays a strategy that runs
through the origin is given by the parameter ρ. The solid line shows the posterior density of
ρ, and the dashed line shows the corresponding prior density. The posterior mean is 87%.
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Figure 12: The probability that a randomly selected participant plays a convex strategy,
given that they play a strategy that intersects the origin, is given by the parameter q0. The
solid line shows the posterior density of q0, and the dashed line shows the corresponding
prior density. The posterior mean is 30%.
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This finding is in broad agreement with that of Coricelli and Nagel (2009), who classify 7 out
of 20 of their participants as greater than 1-step thinkers (35%). Their classification is based
on a simple least-squares based classification with no pooling of data. To quantify what
we mean by “broad agreement”, we compute the expected probability of drawing 7 k-step
compatible strategies from a group of 20, if ρ and q0 were known; then, we take the average
of this probability with respect to our posterior distribution over ρ and q0. We find that,
according to our posterior, observing the proportion of k-step compliant players reported in
Coricelli and Nagel (2009) is an expected probability of 12%.
4.2 Individual-level posterior analysis
We also obtain, for each individual, a strategy curve estimate and corresponding point-wise
95% posterior credible intervals, as well as an estimate that her strategy is k-step compatible.
An illustration is provided in Figure 13, using the same subjects depicted in Figure 5.
These plots guide our intuition as to how the statistical model “interprets” the data. For
instance, the plots reinforce the findings described above based on the posterior distributions
of ρ and q0: many players fail the convexity criterion, despite exhibiting responses that
generally increase in p. We also observe that players with “orderly” responses that fail
convexity are judged to have lower probability of k-step compliance than players who play
more haphazardly; this reflects the fact that for the imprecise player we cannot be certain
that she does not intend to play convex increasing and through the origin, but simply does
so poorly. This effect can be seen in the second and third panels of Figure 13. Although
the general trend of each set of responses appears roughly the same, the tighter precision of
the points in the upper right panel (the first five data points lie perfectly on a line) leads
to less uncertainty, as seen in the narrower shaded credible region compared to the lower
left panel. This tighter uncertainty, along with a data point at p = 1 that is better fit by
a concave strategy, leads to a much lower estimated probability of k-step compliance (only
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Figure 13: Posterior summaries for four representative subjects. The gray shaded region
reflects 95% credible regions for the curve. The posterior mean strategy is shown in red.
The posterior probability of k-step compliance is (from left to right, top to bottom): 92%,
1.4%, 32% and 0%.
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Figure 14: Posterior point estimates of each player’s strategy for all 106 participants. Black
curves correspond to the 23 players whose posterior probability of k-step compliance is
greater than 1/2. Compare to Figure 9, top panel, which displays the equivalent plot for
draws from the prior.
1.4% compared to 32%).
Figure 14 shows posterior point estimates of each player’s strategy. Twenty-three players
are classified as being k-step compliant, meaning that their posterior probability of satisfying
the k-step compatibility criteria is greater than 1/2. This prevalence, 23 out of 106, is only
a bit less than the point estimate for ρq0 of 26%. The discrepancy is appropriate for two
reasons. First, note that in Figure 14 many of the curves are nearly linear, putting them right
on the cusp of convexity. In fact, nearly a quarter of the players have posterior probability
of k-step compliance between 0.4 and 0.6. This equivocal data, combined with a prior which
favors the k-step hypothesis (i.e., E(ρq0) = 56%), leads to the somewhat higher posterior
estimate of ρq0 than the individual estimates would suggest.
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4.3 Alternative strategy types
A promising avenue for future study would be to explicitly include plausible strategies that
are not necessarily representable in the (µ0,Ω) structural model. For example, we observed
that several participants appear to use a “constant increment” strategy, increasing their re-
sponse by a fixed amount as p increased across the experimental values {0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 1}.
See, for example, the data in the upper right panel of Figure 5 (or Figure 13). Because the
difference between p = 0.7 and p = 1 is an increase of 0.3, whereas all other consecutive
values differ by 0.1, this strategy leads to a concave strategy in p. On the one hand, our
statistical model correctly classifies this as a non-k-step strategy. On the other hand, the
Beta noise specification entails that this strategy is still given an 1.4% chance of being k-step
compliant, whereas in light of the alternative “constant increment” hypothesis this estimate
seems much to lenient. Enriching the model with such specific alternative hypotheses would
refine the conclusions of the analysis.
Some subjects’ responses strongly suggest the influence of priming effects (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981), whereby game responses are systematically affected by cues provided in
the instruction set. Specifically, many players copied the demonstrated game play at values
p = 0.3 and p = 0.4 exactly. The “constant increment” strategy described above seems to
be a byproduct of naively extrapolating from these two seed values. Because all players were
given the same instructions, this effect should not interfere with our main conclusion about
the prevalence of k-step thinking, but does undermine the idea that such players are using
k-step thinking even if their responses happened to be convex, increasing and through the
origin. Future experimental designs could leverage the presence of priming effects to better
ascertain which players use k-step thinking, by introducing cues that, if attended to, could
not possibly result in k-step compatible strategy. Modified instructions could, for example,
include example strategies that are non-monotonic functions of p.
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4.4 Covariate analysis
To investigate which player attributes are predictive of playing a k-step compliant strategy,
we regress the posterior probability of being a k-step thinker on the player attributes shown
in Table 4.4. Only time-taken and the cognitive reflection task indicator appear predictive of
k-step compliance. A more sophisticated regression-tree analysis (not reported here) yielded
similar conclusions. Our findings match those of Burnham et al. (2009), who find that lower
responses in a p-beauty contest are positively associated with a cognitive reflection task and
negatively associated with age.
Variable name estimate (%points) p-value
time taken on games (minutes) 3.9 0.005
gender (male) 1.9 0.71
education (bachelors) -4.1 0.69
education (graduate degree) 11.4 0.34
education (high school graduate) 3.2 0.81
education (some college) 0.3 0.97
education (some high school) 2.2 0.77
age in years -0.23 0.38
cognitive reflection task indicator 20.3 0.0006
Table 2: Regressing the posterior probability of k-step compliance against the above at-
tributes reveals that the cognitive reflection dummy variable is the dominant predictor.
In future work, factors that might more strongly predict k-step compliance could be
included. For example, while not as fine-grained as fMRI measurements, recording the
number of times a subject edits his web form may be an excellent proxy of deliberative
reasoning. Ideally, such external confirmatory evidence would be incorporated directly within
the hierarchical model, rather than being regressed upon ex post. In a model expanded to
include proxies for deliberative thinking, subjects would be grouped by these additional
measurements, and pooling of data (via the hierarchical structure of the model) would occur
only between similar subjects.
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In light of our finding that many people do not apply k-step reasoning, a future line of
research would be to conduct experiments to determine various ways that individuals might
be induced to do so. An individual’s posterior probability of k-step reasoning, as produced
from our analysis, could serve as an outcome variable in experiments that vary incentives,
instructions, and practice on similar games.
5 Summary
Understanding how people reason about the reasoning of others—how they think strategi-
cally in multiplayer games—is a fundamental question of behavioral science. Experimen-
tal evidence from simple multiplayer games has revealed that real players do not adhere
to the theoretically optimal strategies defined by classical game theory. Alternative, non-
equilibrium, theories based on iterated reasoning have been shown to be better at predicting
how players will actually respond in such games. However, the sheer diversity of behavior ob-
served in beauty contest data makes model estimation difficult. Models that are sufficiently
flexible are unidentified and unilluminating, while estimates from more restricted models are
liable to be distorted by data from subjects who violate the assumptions of the given model.
We contribute to this literature by analyzing data from a newly conducted beauty con-
test experiment. Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we introduce a flexible k-step
thinking model to describe player responses in beauty contest experiments and deduce two
compatibility criteria that strategies generated according to this model must have. Second,
we fit an even more flexible, purely descriptive statistical model to the player response data.
We identify k-step compatible strategies by observing which players’ strategies satisfy these
compatibility criteria. This approach allows (an upper bound on) the prevalence of k-step
strategies to be estimated without imposing assumptions about the distribution of player
types or on players’ beliefs about this distribution.
Using our approach, we estimate that approximately 25% of participants from our study
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population (Amazon Turk users in the United States) play k-step compatible strategies. This
figure is somewhat lower, but broadly consistent with, the comparable study of Coricelli and
Nagel (2009) which was based on a much smaller sample size.
An interesting implication of our analysis is that additional research regarding the k-
step incompatible strategies could prove fruitful. Many of the inferred strategies, while
demonstrably not k-step compatible, appear far more structured than would be expected
from a purely random player. Careful examination of our individual-level strategy curve
estimates suggests that more elaborate error models — such as non-strategic models based
on known cognitive biases, such as priming — could help refine future estimates of the
prevalence of true strategic thinkers. Individual-level estimates from hierarchical Bayesian
models, such as ours, can also be used as outcome variables in experiments designed to
investigate determinants of strategic sophistication. We hope that our study will motivate
additional work along these lines and prove a useful tool for future empirical studies on
strategic reasoning in games.
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Appendix A: Computational details
Posterior sampling is performed via a Metropolis-within-Gibbs approach. We sequentially
sample parameters, given the current value of all other parameters, according to the Metropolis-
Hastings acceptance probabilities. A challenge with this approach is to devise suitable pro-
posal densities. We utilize a random-walk approach. As many of the model parameters
are restricted to the unit interval, we introduce a latent variable representation using the
“wrapping function”:
g(x) = x− bxc+ 1(x < 0),
where bxc denotes the integer part of x. This function maps numbers in the unit interval to
themselves, while numbers outside the unit interval get mapped back to their fractional part,
in the case of positive numbers, or one minus their fractional part, in the case of negative
numbers. So 0.8 gets mapped to itself; 1.3 gets mapped to 0.3; -2.4 gets mapped to 0.6.
For a parameter, such as µ0, restricted to the unit interval, we conduct a random walk over
parameters µ˜ on the whole real line and define µ ≡ g(µ˜). The µ˜ parameters are unidentified,
but this is irrelevant as we report inferences and define priors on the original, identified scale.
(Note that ηi is restricted to [0.3, 0.7] rather than [0, 1], so g(·) must be modified accordingly
by a simple rescaling.)
For the φi parameters, which can be exactly zero with positive probability, we also in-
troduce a binary latent variable zi and define φi = zig(φ˜i). We conduct the random walk on
the real line with φ˜ and transform to φi for likelihood evaluations.
1. For each i, sample (ηi, φi, νi, µi | –) according to a Metropolis ratio using likelihood and
prior given in (2) and (9) respectively. Proposal density evaluations can be avoided by
using a symmetric random walk over the elements of η˜i, φ˜i, ν˜i and µ˜
0
i , centered at the
current values.
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2. For each i, sample (zi | –) using a straightforward application of Bayes rule.
3. For each i, sample (si | –) using a straightforward application of Bayes rule.
4. Sample (w | –) from a Dirichlet distribution with parameter α∗ = α + κ, where κ
records counts of how many observations are currently assigned to each level of s.
5. Sample (ρ | –) as a Beta(γ, β) random variable. Let n1 =
∑
i zi and n0 =
∑
i(1− zi).
Then γ = 3 + n0 and β = 1 + n1.
6. Sample (q0 | –) as a Beta(γ, β) random variable. Let nq0 be the number of players for
whom both φi = 0 and νi < µ
0
i ηi. Then γ = 3 + nq0 and β = 1 + n0 − nq0.
7. Sample (q1 | –) s a Beta(γ, β) random variable. Let nq1 be the number of players for
whom both φi 6= 0 and νi < µ0i ηi. Then γ = 3 + nq1 and β = 1 + n0 − nq1.
Appendix B: Diagnostic plots
Below, we include trace plots for key parameters from the MCMC sampler. By this rough
metric, mixing looks adequate. Subject-specific samples are shown, arbitrarily, for partici-
pant #100. Although hard to discern in the plot for φ, 75% of the samples drawn are φ = 0.
Also we provide a Geweke-Brooks diagnostic plot for ρ, q0 and q1; for an explanation of this
plot, see Plummer et al. (2006).
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